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Recenti contributi dell’economia dell’informazione sottolineano il ruolo degli VSLOORYHU
informativi. In contesti caratterizzati da elevata incertezza, le decisioni di ciascun operatore
forniscono flussi informativi VSLOORYHU utili per le scelte di agenti che fronteggiano un problema
simile. Questo lavoro costituisce un primo tentativo di offrire evidenza empirica sulla rilevanza di
tali flussi, studiando il ruolo degli VSLOORYHUper le scelte di aggiustamento del fattore lavoro da parte
delle imprese. L’ipotesi di partenza è che gli VSLOORYHU richiedono congiuntamente la similarità
nell’attività produttiva e la prossimità fisica fra le imprese, due caratteristiche definitorie dei distretti
industriali, che costituiscono quindi  un laboratorio ideale per verificare la validità di tali teorie.
Utilizzando un SDQHOdi circa 2.300 imprese distrettuali per il periodo 1982-1996, si analizza
come le scelte individuali in termini di variazione dell’occupazione siano influenzate dal
comportamento delle altre imprese del medesimo settore appartenenti allo stesso distretto. I
principali risultati sono riassumibili nei seguenti termini:
- controllando per shock aggregati ed individuali, l’aggiustamento percentuale nel fattore
lavoro a livello individuale risente sensibilmente di quello medio delle altre imprese del settore
nello stesso distretto. Particolarmente importanti sono gli aggiustamenti di maggior entità,
presumibilmente a causa della loro maggior visibilità rispetto a quelli modesti;
- in linea con le previsioni della teoria, l’aggiustamento delle imprese distrettuali di un settore
non è influenzato né da quello delle imprese che appartengono allo stesso distretto ma a un diverso
settore  né da quello delle imprese del settore localizzate al di fuori del distretto;
- il processo di diffusione dell’informazione è influenzato da alcune caratteristiche del gruppo
di riferimento, come il numero di imprese del settore e la presenza di imprese di grosse dimensioni;
- gli VSLOORYHUinformativi costituiscono un elemento di amplificazione degli shock aggregati e
inducono una tendenza alla concentrazione temporale dei fenomeni riallocativi in quanto le imprese
tendono ad aggiustare simultaneamente;
- la sensitività dell’aggiustamento individuale a quello delle altre imprese è inversamente
proporzionale alla dimensione dell’impresa, una indicazione che le piccole imprese fanno maggior








































Recent years have seen the emergence of a new literature that emphasizes the interaction
between information acquisition and agents’ decisions. Although there are various strands,
the common feature of this literature is that agents can acquire useful information through
social learning, i.e. by observing the behavior of other agents facing the same problem. The
central ideais that the lack of information about some underlying state variable that is of public
interest can be made up for, at least partly, by looking at what other, similar agents do. If the
information that is privately available to agent  to form his decisions has somevalue for agent
 - a neighbor of ’s - the observation of ’s actions can help B to make a better decision
since ’s actions will partly reveal his information.
More generally, consider situations where a pool of agents are uncertain about some
relevant common variable and can learn about it through time by direct accumulation of
information. Suppose each agent has some private piece of information which if pooled with
the others’ would increase the information available to each. If pooling is ruled out, each
agent’s private information will be embedded in his decisions thus, the other agents’ choices
become an alternative source of information. As a consequence, individual agents’ decisions
will be affected both by their private information and by other agents’ decisions. In other
words, private information spills over through individual actions.
This process of social learning can be seen at work in a variety of situations for
instance, a decision to enter a new market with uncertain demand is likely to be affected by
the observation of other ¿rms entering and the performance of previous entrants. Similarly,
the decision to undertake an investment project or to hire or lay off workers may bene¿t from
the observation of what neighbor ¿rms do. On the consumer’s side, the decision to try a
new product is likely to be inÀuenced by the observed popularity of the product with other
consumers the same holds for the choice of a book or a movie. During a bank run as well, the
single depositor’s decision to withdraw will depend not only on his own assessment but also
4 We are grateful to Giuseppe Bertola, William Brock, Ricardo Caballero, Andrew Caplin, Steve Davis,
Thomas Steinberger, Federico Signorini and Joseph Zeira for discussions and suggestions. We received help-
ful comments from seminar participants at the Bank of Italy and at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the Society
for Economic Dynamics, Alghero. We alone are responsible for all remaining errors. Luigi Guiso thanks
the Italian Ministry of Universities and Scienti¿c Research (MURST) for ¿nancial support. The views ex-
pressed here are our own and do not necessarily reÀect those of the Bank of Italy. E-mail: guiso@tin.it,
schivardi.fabiano@insedia.interbusiness.it8
on what the other depositors do, as this may reveal valuable information on the fragility of the
bank. Information spillovers have been cited, as an important factor in determining the timing
and extent of the recent crisis in Asia, as investors were learning about the structural problems
of those economies at the same time as the crisis was erupting.
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The theory, then, is relatively well developed but, to our knowledge, there are essentially
no studies testing its empirical validity. Our intention is to ¿ll this gap. To this end we rely
on a panel of Italian industrial ¿rms that allows us to classify them into two groups, a VWXG\
group of ¿rms that are more likely to be exposed to information spillovers and a FRQWURO group
for which information is unlikely to be passed on through their actions. The idea is that social
learning will only take place if: D ¿rms’ actions convey useful information because their
problem is analogous to that faced by other ¿rms and E these actions are readily observable.
Thus, to identify exposure to information spillovers we rely on ¿rms’ VLPLODULW\, identi¿ed
with their product brand, and SUR[LPLW\,d e ¿ ned in terms of geographical distance. Similarity
assures that other ¿rms’ actions potentially contain valuable information, proximity implies
that they are easily observable.
To classify ¿rms according to the degree of exposure to information spillovers we use
locationwithinanindustrialdistrict. OneinterestingfeatureoftheItalianeconomyisthatoften
¿rms, particularly small and medium-sized ¿rms specialized in the production of a particular
good, such as ties, chairs, shoes and leather goods, textiles, corks, etc., tend to group together
in the VDPH DUHD, which becomes an industrial district. Presumably ¿rms in a district should
be more exposed to spillovers than ¿rms in the VDPH LQGXVWU\ that are not part of a district.
Our test for the existence of information spillovers turns on the adjustment of productive
factors. We relate the factor adjustment of a given ¿rm in a given sector and located in a given
district to the adjustment of the other ¿rms in the same sector and district and to that of ¿rms
that are in the same sector but outside the district or are located in the district but produce
unrelated goods. If information spillovers are present, we expect that - controlling for shocks
- one ¿rm’s adjustment is affected by the adjustments of ¿rms in the same district and sector
5 Note that nothing ensures that the information gathered by observing other agents’ behavior will always
be correct. Indeed, if some agents hold incorrect beliefs about the underlying state variable, they might transmit
such beliefs to the other agents, thus generating negative information. This possibility is studied in models of
herding behavior and information cascades, reviewed below. We will return to this point later, showing how the
structure of the reference group can inÀuence the possibility that such an event takes place.9
but is unaffected by that of ¿rms outside the district or the sector or both. Furthermore, for
¿rms not located in a district, what other similar ¿rms do should be irrelevant. Our ¿ndings
are consistent with the idea that learning takes place not only through the direct signals that
a ¿rm receives on its market environment but also by exploiting the information contained in
other ¿rms’ actions. Indeed, if each ¿rm has just one small, independent piece of information
and there are many participants, the information contained in other ¿rms’ action may be much
more valuable than that directly available to the ¿rm.
We start in Section 2 by reviewing the theoretical literature on information spillovers
and ¿rms’ decisions. In Section 3 we lay out a simple analytical framework to organize
our empirical strategy and derive the main implications to be tested. Section 4 addresses the
identi¿cation problem that emerges in estimating models with social interactions. In Section 5
we describe the data and discuss how we measure exposure to information spillovers. Section
6 presents the results of the estimates for the adjustment of labor in our basic speci¿cation
Section 7 extends the estimates in various directions and checks their robustness to changes in
speci¿cation and sample selection. Section 8 tests some implications of information spillovers
for ¿rms’ response to aggregate shocks, showing that they can be a powerful mechanism of
ampli¿cation of business Àuctuations. Section 9 considers the effect of different reference
group structures on the learning process and, through that, on the performance of ¿rms.
Section 10 concludes.
 5HYLHZ RI WKH OLWHUDWXUH
Thetheoretical literatureon information spillovers studieshowsociallearning inÀuences
the decision-making of an agent who faces an optimization problem in an uncertain
environment. The focus is on how the private information of the agents is transmitted through
actions, and how information spillovers inÀuence the timing and outcomes of the decision-
making process. A useful classi¿cation is based on timing. A ¿rst group of models assumes
that actions are taken sequentially and at a pre-set time, and that before taking decisions each
agent can observe the actions of the previous agents. This literature is mainly concerned with
the possibility of LQIRUPDWLRQ FDVFDGHV, which occur when agents disregard their own private
information and base their action only on the history of previous actions.
3 As e c o n dc l a s s
6 See the seminal contributions of Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et al. (1992), or Bikhchandani et al.
(1998) for a recent survey. Anderson and Holt (1997) ¿nd that information cascades tend to occur frequently10
of models, which is the direct reference of our empirical work, endogenizes the timing of
actions, so that in each period all agents can decide their course of action, unless they have
already made an irreversible decision. Chamley and Gale (1994) consider the case of a group
of agents that get the option to make an investment of uncertain value (but perfectly correlated
across agents) the value, in turn, is positively correlated with the unknown fraction of agents
in the population that get the option. They show that the equilibrium involves inef¿cient delay,
because each agent has an incentive to wait to see how many others exercise the option, to
better asses the optimality of doing so. Caplin and Leahy (1994) study a model of a multi-
stage investment project with a continuum of ¿rms, in which at each stage each agent receives
a private signal about the common value of the project, and decides whether to maintain
the investment or to pull out. In their equilibrium, actions have an extremely discontinuous
character, with a phase of no action followed by a period in which the actions of a fraction of
agents totally resolve uncertainty, thus prompting a large mass of agents to act simultaneously
in the subsequent period. Rob (1991) and Horvath et al. (1997) study the effect of the
information revealed by previous entrants on subsequent entry into a market with unknown
demand. Rob obtains an entry pattern that is monotonically decreasing over time, whereas
Horvath gets different entry patterns according to the structure of uncertainty, including paths
with a discontinuous character, in which most of the ¿rms enter the market in a short period of
time. Backing away from full rationality, Ellison and Fudenberg (1993, 1995) propose a model
in which boundedly rational agents choose between two alternative technologies according to
a rule that weights new information and the behavior of other agents. Their models offer
an alternative way to rationalize the correlation between individual and aggregate decisions
and show that even naive rules can lead to socially ef¿cient outcomes. In an extension of
the model, they introduce different locations and assume that each agent looks only at the
decisions of people in the neighborhood this idea constitutes the basis of our own empirical
approach. In a similar framework, Bala and Goyal (1998) study the role of the structure of
the reference group on the learning process. They show that if the group has a small subset of
players with particularly high visibility, such as a few large ¿rms in an environment of small
¿rms, then information cascades can occur even where the timing of actions is endogenous
and choices are repeated over time, with negative effects on ¿rms’ pro¿tability. At the same
in controlled experiments. In a recent paper, Avery and Zemsky (1998) show that they cannot arise in ¿nancial
markets if there is a market maker that observes the previous pattern of transactions, because the latter will price
according to such information, thus prompting the agent to resort to private information.11
time, the probability of a cascade occurring decreases with the size of the reference group. We
will test the validity of these predictions in the context of our empirical speci¿cation.
One of the main implications of this strand of the literature is that, under certain
informational conditions, the pattern of agents’ actions will follow a distinctive path. If
decisions are costly to reverse, the fact that each agent can extract useful information from
the actions of others constitutes an incentive to delay actions by comparison with the case
where learning is strictly individual. Once some agents act, however, the information revealed
could induce further actions, triggering a self-reinforcing process that will lead a large number
of agents to act within a brief period. We should therefore observe a positive correlation
between the individual and the aggregate level of activity, even after controlling for exogenous
causal factors. In addition, one should observe periods of low activity, in which the incentive
to delay dominates, followed by periods of sharp increase in the level of activity, without large
changes in the underlying state variables.
4 Schivardi (1998) applies this idea to explain the
largeincrease in job destruction in cyclical troughs (Davis et al., 1996), showing howrelatively
small aggregate shocks can induce a burst of reallocation if they touch off information
revelation.
We are not aware of any empirical study directly addressing information spillovers.
Some parallel lines of research should be kept in mind, however, and may be usefully reviewed
to better identify the speci¿city of information spillovers. One such is the literature on location
choices inrelationtoNQRZOHGJH spillovers. Thisliteraturehasbeeninspired by therecentsurge
of interest in economic geography, which stresses that production tends to be concentrated in
regions that specialize in some particular product.
5 The idea is that there might be substantial
increasing returns from concentrating ¿rms in a given location, due to knowledge spillovers,
which occur when the expertise and the R&D of one ¿rm bene¿t the neighbors. While
the results are far from conclusive, a consensus has emerged that knowledge spillovers are
an important factor in ¿rms’ location. For example, Ellison and Glaser (1997) construct a
series of indexes to study concentration and show that, for the US economy, production is
more concentrated than a random distribution of ¿rms would predict, even controlling for the
7 Models that formalize this idea are presented, among others, by Caplin and Leahy (1994, 1996), Chamley
and Gale (1994) and Horvath HW DO. (1997).
8 See for example Audtretsch (1998), Feldman and Audretsch (1998), Harrison et al. (1996), Jaffe et at
(1993), Wallsten (1998).12
natural characteristics of the regions. Moreover, the narrower the de¿nition of the sectors, the
greater the degree of concentration. We see these results as complementary to our own. This
literature focuses on knowledge spillovers, i.e. spillovers that directly affect productivity. We
consider, instead, the effects of actions through the changes they induce in the information
set, without necessarily inducing a change in any real variable. Moreover, our analysis is
at high frequencies, considering the changes in factors in response to business cycle shocks,
while economic geography takes a longer-run perspective, stressing the knowledge spillovers
as factors in the long-term development of regions and in growth.
Our work is also related to the macroeconomic literature on production spillovers
at business cycle frequencies,
6 initiated by Caballero and Lyon (1992). This literature is
predicated on the observation that labor productivity is procyclical. This could be interpreted
as a sign that the productivity of the single ¿rm is positively affected by the aggregate level of
activity, due to some form of thick-market externality (Diamond, 1982). External economies
could then induce a positive correlation across ¿rms in factors demand, independently of
information spillovers. In recent years, a body of literature has challenged theassertion thatthe
Solow residual is procyclical, claiming that the empirical ¿nding disappears when one takes
account of variations in effort, intermediate goods, cyclical variations in capital utilization
and aggregation effects.
7 Moreover, even assuming that the empirical ¿nding is correct,
there are other explanations for pro-cyclical Solow residuals, such as labor hoarding (Basu
and Kimball, 1997), internal increasing returns (Hall, 1988) or changes in the distribution
of ¿rms’ productivity due to entry and exit (Horvath, 1999). Due also to Sbordone (1997),
who considers the different dynamic implications of the alternative explanations, a consensus
has emerged that external effects cannot be the main reason for the procyclical nature of
productivity. Although we also offer direct evidence on the importance of information Àows
in inducing positive correlation in labor adjustments, we consider that the consensus view’s
underplaying the roleof external economies contributes to ruling out an alternative explanation
for our empirical ¿ndings.
9 SeeforexampleBasuandKimball(1997),CaballeroandLyon(1992), Hall(1988),JimenezandMarchetti
(1998) and Sbordone (1997).
: See for example Basu and Fernal (1997) and Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (1995).13
 $ VLPSOH DQDO\WLFDO IUDPHZRUN
To illustrate our empirical speci¿cation, we construct a simple reduced-form model that
abstracts from the strategic aspects underlying information spillovers, which are discussed in
the papers reviewed in Section 2. Assume that the prospects of a ¿rm at time | are summarized
by a state variable fE|,w h i c hi sas u f ¿ cient statistic for determining the optimal level of
the ¿rm’s factors of production ￿E| (employment or the stock of capital). For ¿rm L,t h e
evolution of the state variable is governed by the following equation:








where .￿E| and .E| are log-normally distributed, independent random variables. Equation
(1) shows that the evolution of ¿rm L¶s prospects depends on a ¿rm-speci¿c characteristic,
￿, which may be thought of as long-run ef¿ciency an idiosyncratic shock, .￿E| and a
common shock .E|. The assumption that the adjustment of other ¿rms inÀuences ¿rm ’s
evaluation is modeled by assuming that ¿rmL￿s prospects improves if other ¿rmsareincreasing
their factor of production and conversely. For example, an entrepreneur might become more
pessimistic upon observing other ¿rms in the same sector going out of business, assigning a
higher weight to any negative signal.
8 The adjustment of other ¿rms is denoted by 3￿E|,
with q2 parameterizing the strength of the channel. If what other ¿rms do has no effect on
¿rm ￿s evaluation, then q2 'f . For any variable t E|,d e ¿ ne +E|  *L}t E|*L}t E|.
Then, taking logs in equation (1), rede¿ning k ' *L}c " '* L }.and rearranging, we get:
%￿E|'k ￿nq f" ￿E | nq ￿" E | nq 2? 3 ￿E |   (2)
Finally, we assume that the percentage change in factor depends on that in f:
?￿E|'sE % ￿E |  n ￿E| (3)
; Indeed, the adjustment of others could be thought of as amplifying a given realization of the aggregate
shock H+w,> a point to which we return later.14
where ￿E| is an error term uncorrelated with "￿E| and "E|. Assuming that sE is an af¿ne
transformation, so that sE%'@nK%, substituting equation (2) into (3) and assuming without
loss of generality K 'we obtain our basic empirical speci¿cation:
?￿E|'@nk ￿nq f" ￿E | nq ￿" E | nq 2? 3 ￿E | n ￿E |  (4)
Theabsenceof informationspillovers impliesq2 'f , andthishypothesis can bedirectly
tested once we specify how to measure ?3￿E|. In our basic speci¿cation we will measure the
adjustment of others as the mean adjustment of ¿rms in ’s reference group, excluding L¶s
adjustment. Notice that information spillovers tend to induce co-movement among the ¿rms
that are subject to them since they add a common factor. Thus, one should ¿nd a higher degree
of co-movement among ¿rms with a high degree of exposure to information spillovers, an
implication that will be discussed in future work.
The speci¿cation in equation (4) has two features: ¿rst, it implies a linear response of
?￿E| to the adjustment of others. Yet it may be that the ¿rm’s adjustment is triggered by
the adjustment of others only when the latter is substantial. This would occur, for instance,
if there were costs of adjusting factors as in Caplin and Leahy (1994) so that agents tend to
adjust infrequently but substantially. We will account for the presence of non-linearities by
replacing the mean adjustment in equation (4) with various quintiles of the distribution of the
adjustment of others. Second, what matters is assumed to be the current adjustment of others
thus, one could ask who adjusts ¿rst. With high frequency data, the lagged adjustment would
be more appropriate with annual data such as ours, simultaneous adjustment is probably not
too restrictive and as Section 6 shows, this intuition is supported by our empirical evidence.
 ,GHQWL¿FDWLRQ DQG WKH ³UHÀHFWLRQ´ SUREOHP
A potentially serious problem in estimating equation (4) is that it could be impossible
to identify q2, owing to what Manski (1993) calls the “reÀection problem”. This arises
because the actions of the individual agents in a group are related to the average action of the
members of the group through an adding-up condition. Thus, without some prior restriction,
the parameter characterizing the presence of information spillovers (and in general the other15
parameters as well) is not identi¿ed. To illustrate the identi¿cation problem, consider a
simpli¿ed version of equation (4):
?￿E|'K f ￿nK ￿5nK 2? 3 ￿ (5)
where ￿ is an individual characteristics and 5 is a characteristic common to all elements of the
reference group, and where for simplicity we have dropped the time index | and the random
component ￿.
Notice that, for all |, ￿
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gis the (known) number of ¿rms in the reference group. Using (5), averaging over  and
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'￿ n  7  n 5 (7)
Suppose now that 7  ' 5c that is the variable that enters the equation individually, is the same
one that enters as average then, we can factor equation (7) as
?￿ ' ￿ nE n 5 (8)
This is the situation analyzed in Manski (1993), and identi¿cation cannot be achieved unless
we impose some additional restrictions. This is clear from (7) where only the composite
parameters  and E n  are identi¿ed. However, as noted by Brock and Durlauf (1999), if
5 9'7 c so that ￿ only enters the equation individually, than the system is identi¿ed and we
can retrieve the social interaction parameter.
9 Notice that, to make the illustration as simple
< Dividing D by E in equation (7) and taking N as known, one recovers parameter e5 given e5 the other
parameters are obtained.16
as possible, we have assumed that ￿ and 5 are scalars. The argument generalizes to the case
in which  and 5 are vectors, in which case the condition for non-identi¿cation is that all the
variables that enter individually also enter as averages, that is   5 Notice also that the
identi¿cation problem only arises if the social interaction variable enters equation (5) linearly:
otherwise, 7  would also enter equation (7) in a nonlinear fashion, and the factorization of
equation (8) would not be possible even if  ' 5.
10 We will exploit this property in a set of
regressions later.
To achieve identi¿cation in our empirical speci¿cation, we rely on proxies for liquidity
constraints. It is our contention that liquidity constraints are an impediment to adjustment,
especially when it involves pecuniary costs. This is obvious in the case of upward adjustments
in the quantity of factors of production, as they directly involve pecuniary outlays. But even
downward adjustments, particularly in labor, might imply pecuniary costs, as is stressed by
the literature on ¿ring costs. Firing workers in Italy involves, among other things, a severance
payment dependent on the worker’s seniority, which can be as large as 2 or 3 times a worker’s
annual wage.
11 In these circumstances, adjustment may be blocked by liquidity constraints
arising from limited access to credit.
12 To achieve identi¿cation we will insert in our empirical
speci¿cation ¿rm-level proxies for liquidity constraints and assume that while they affect
¿rms directly, their group average does not directly affect ¿rms’ adjustment decisions. Our
justi¿cation for this is that ¿rms’ creditworthiness - which determines access to credit -
depends on ¿rm-speci¿c variables but not on group averages once the former are controlled
for
13.
43 More precisely, the model is identi¿ed if the social interaction term is a nonlinear function of the data. We
refer the interested reader to Brock and Durlauf (1999), who give an excellent treatment of the issues reviewed
here.
44 At the time of separation each worker is entitled one month’s gross wage for every year of service.
45 An alternative way to achieve identi¿cation would be to use ¿rm-level measures of adjustment costs, if
available. Our approach can, in a sense, be regarded as equivalent. Although very little has been done on the
interaction between ¿nancial constraintsandadjustment costs, a fewpaperspoint out that theyareobservationally
equivalent. Within the context of a business-cycle general equilibrium model, Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) show
that ¿nancial market imperfections can be regarded as endogenous costs of adjusting the capital stock. More
closely related to our approach is the paper by Campbell and Fisher (1998) who claim that differences in the
observed job creation and destruction rates of U.S. manufacturing plants are better explained by differences in
employment adjustment costs across plants rather than in ¿nancial constraints. Implicitly, they are assuming that
¿nancial constraints affect ¿rms’ production factor adjustment in the same way as adjustment costs.
46 This is not to say that ¿rms in one district cannot all get more credit than ¿rms in another district. For
instance, if all ¿rms in a certain district use less speci¿c capital than ¿rms in another district, compared to the17
 'DWD GHVFULSWLRQ
We estimate several variants of the model illustrated in Section 3, using a panel of
Italian manufacturing ¿rms drawn from the Company Accounts Data Service (CADS), which
collects annual balance-sheet data on a sample of about 30,000 ¿rms, over a period of 15 years
(from 1982 to 1996). Besides reporting balance-sheet information the Service also reports
employment and a detailed description of company characteristics.
14 To identify ¿rms with
high exposure to information spillovers, we merge this database with the Industrial Districts
Database (IDD) constructed by the National Statistical Institute (Istat). To this purpose
Italy is divided into ORFDO ODERU V\VWHPV (LLS), i.e. territorial groupings of municipalities
characterized by a certain degree of commuting by the resident population. If an LLS is
characterized by a high concentration of small and medium-sized ¿rms in the same two-
digit sector classi¿cation, it is classi¿ed as a district. Districts are allocated to a 9-sector
classi¿cation according to their product specialization. We then identify ¿rms that are in the
same district and sector and thereby divide the sample into a study group (¿rms in the same
district and sector, i.e. those with high exposure to information spillovers) and a control group
of low exposure ¿rms (¿rms in the same sector but not located in districts). The geographical
classi¿cation ensures that the ¿rms that we include in the study group satisfy the observability
criterion. Since they belong to the same sector, the similarity requirement is also ful¿lled. In
fact, this is an ideal context to test the relevance of information spillovers in shaping ¿rms’
decisions. Table 1 reports summary information sector-by-sector for the sample, using Istat’s
9-sectorclassi¿cation. Panel Acompares thesamplewith the population the¿rsttwo columns
show the incidence of employment in specialized district ¿rms (i.e. ¿rms located in a district
and belonging to the speci¿ed sector) on total employment in the sector for the sample and
for the population, respectively. It is clear that the sample tracks the population very well.
“Textiles and clothing”, “leather and footwear”, “wood, furniture, construction materials and
glass”, “machinery, computers and production tools” stand as sectors where a large portion of
total output is accounted for by districts. These are also the sectors where districts are most
common and they accountfor 167 out of the total of199 (Column 6). Fortheremaining sectors
latter they will be more creditworthy since they can offer better collateral, and thus all have greater debt capacity.
However, district average creditworthiness - as measured by the district average capital speci¿city - will play no
role once ¿rms’ capital speci¿city is controlled for.
47 For a more detailed description of the CADS database, see the Appendix.18
the share of employment accounted for by specialized district ¿rms is minor. Columns 3 and
4 show employment in specialized district ¿rms as a share of total employment in the district
for the sample and for the entire population. Again, the structure of employment in the sample
is close to that in the population, particularly in those sectors where production typically takes
place in districts. Panel B reports summary statistics for the total sample by sector.
The overall sample has two problems: ¿rst, for some districts, there are only a few ¿rms.
For instance, the average number of specialized district ¿rms in “food, beverages and tobacco”
is 9.8, and in 1991 only 1 district out of 16 had more than 30 ¿rms the corresponding ¿gures
for “paper, printing products and publishing” are 4.3 and 0 and for “metallurgy and metal
products” 3 and 0. If not all ¿rms in the true reference group are included, then relying
on a small sample may lead to noisy measures of the adjustment of others. We tackle this
by excluding all the districts with fewer than 30 ¿rms in any sample year.
15 Second, some
sectors are characterized by a high degree of heterogeneity when a two-digit classi¿cation is
u s e d ,m a k i n gi th a r dt of u l ¿ ll the similarity criterion. The last column of the table classi¿es
the 9 sectors according to product heterogeneity. The classi¿cation was made by informally
comparing the list of products in the 4-digit classi¿cation for each of the 9 sectors. Some
sectors show a high degree of product heterogeneity. When relevant, we have dealt with
this problem by reclassifying districts according to their specialization at the three-digit level.
Sometimes, however, even at the three-digit level there remains considerable heterogeneity -
as in some mechanical industries. In these cases - given that a four-digit classi¿cation was
never feasible in terms of observations - we have dropped the districts. After these exclusions,
we are left with 14 districts in 5 sectors for a total of 20,334 observations and 1,485 ¿rms
non-district ¿rms in the ¿ve sectors are 3,146 for a total of 42,022 observations.
16
Table 2 reports summary statistics for each sector and district and for non-district ¿rms,
taking 1991 as the reference year. It is worth noticing that the sectors selected are those that,
48 This excludes ¿rms producing “rubber, plastic and chemical products” and ¿rms classi¿ed as “other man-
ufacturing”.
49 To reduce product heterogeneity we have split the “textiles & clothing” sector into its two components
“textiles” on the one hand and “clothing” on the other. Since none of the “clothing” districts in the sample had
the minimum number of ¿rms, they were all dropped. We have also reclassi¿ed the mechanical sector using
a three-digit classi¿cation the only sector with a low degree of product heterogeneity that had the minimum
number of ¿rms was “production tools”, which has three districts. Finally, we have separated “wood & furniture”
from “construction materials and glass” which in the 9-sector classi¿cation are lumped together. This way, we
retain three districts in “wood & furniture” and one in “construction materials and glass”.19
on the basis of panel A of Table 1, have the highest incidence of employment in district ¿rms,
and all of Italy’s well-known industrial districts are included in the sample. Most districts are
in “textiles” (6 out of 14) and are located in the North (10 out of 14) only 4 are in the Center
and none in the South. This is consistent with the general under-industrialization of the South.
The size of the districts measured by the number of specialized ¿rms (observations) ranges
from a minimum of 38 ¿rms (552 observations) in the production tools district of Padua,
to 329 (4,250) in the wool district of Prato. District ¿rms are typically small, their average
size ranging from a low of 26 employees (in the Prato district) to a high of 113 (Cossato).
Concentration of production - measured by the ratio of the 95th percentile of employment
to the median (Column 4) - is generally small, as one would expect in a network of similar
¿rms. Yet it varies across districts, as does ¿rm performance (return on assets, Column 6).
In Section 9 we investigate the relation between ¿rm performance and district concentration.
Column 8 reports the share of ¿rms in the modal four digit sector both within each district
and for ¿rms out of districts. As expected, the concentration is generally higher within each
district, indicating a tendency to specialize in some particular production. This is stronger for
the leather and the furniture sectors (which are more concentrated also out of districts), while
“textiles” and “production tools” are characterized by a majority of districts where the modal
four-digit sector accounts for less than ¿fty percent of specialized ¿rms. The high degree
of similarity among district ¿rms could give rise to a correlation in factor adjustments not
necessarily due to information spillovers, a possibility that we will explicitly take into account
in our empirical analysis. Finally, the last column of Table 2 reports the number of non-
specialized ¿rms - i.e. ¿rms located in the district but producing different goods. Comparing
the average number of specialized and non-specialized ¿rms gives a clue of the production
focus of the various districts and reveals that districts differ along this dimension as well.
 5HVXOWV
We start estimating equation (4) for the whole sample of district ¿rms. One can base
the tests on any factor of production we choose to rely on labor adjustments and disregard
the adjustment of the stock of capital. The fact is that we have information on employment
year by year, but no reliable data on capital. Balance-sheet data are reported at historical costs,
and the time span covered by the data is too short to use permanent inventory methodology
to estimate the capital stock. In order to implement speci¿cation (4) we still need measures20
of the aggregate and speci¿c shocks that ¿rms face. It is now well established that ¿rms’
adjustments are characterized by considerable heterogeneity (Davis and Haltiwanger (1992),
Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1997), Boeri (1996)). To control for such differences,
we run an auxiliary regression of the rate of growth of real sales in deviation from its mean
and standardized with its standard deviation, on a full set of year dummies interacted with
location and sector dummies to allow for aggregate shocks differing across area and sector. To
better account for local shocks, for district ¿rms we allow for one location dummy for each
district, while for non-district ¿rms we use provinces.
17 We then use the ¿tted values from this
regression (common within a group of ¿rms in the same region and sector) as a measure of the
aggregate shocks the residuals are taken as proxies of the idiosyncratic shocks.
18
As argued in Section 4, to achieve identi¿cation we follow the idea that adjustment
involves pecuniary costs that are more easily faced if no credit impediments are present. We
proxy ¿nancial constraints at ¿rm level using the ratio of cash Àow to total sales.
19 Since
both positive and negative adjustment should be dampened by ¿nancial constraints, we expect
more positive and more negative adjustments by the less severely credit-constrained ¿rms. To
capture this effect we interact the proxy for ¿nancial constraints with two dummies, one for
non-positive and one for non-negative adjustments. If these variables are picking up ease of
adjustment we should ¿nd a positive effect on the ¿rst interaction and a negative on the second.
Indeed, in all regressions the pattern of signs is as expected.
20
For each ¿rm and for each year in the sample, we measure the adjustment by other ¿rms
in the same district and sector (the reference group) as the (unweighted) average percentage
4: Italy is divided into 103 provinces, roughly comparable to US countries. This is the ¿nest classi¿cation al-
lowed by our dataset for non-district ¿rms. A district is a much smaller territory than a province, often coinciding
with a few suburbs of a city or town.
4; Given that the regressions include a measure of ¿rm-speci¿c shocks to sales one could argue that identi-
¿cation of social effects could be reached this way however, since they average out to zero within districts they
cannot help achieving identi¿cation.
4< We have also experimented with alternative measures of credit constraints, such as the share of intangible
assets on total assets - a measure of the ¿rm’s ability to pledge collateral - and the share of liquid assets on total
assets, an indicator of the ability to face liquidity needs. Our results are essentially invariant to the measure used,
and thus we only report those based on cash Àow.
53 To save on space we do not report the coef¿cients of the proxies for liquidity constraints in all regressions
they turn out to be statistically signi¿cant and to have the expected signs. In general, the positive adjustment
interaction carries a larger coef¿cient, suggesting that liquidity constraints matter most when factors are adjusted
upwards.21
change in employment by the ¿rms in the group, excluding the adjustment of the ¿rm in
question. If the signals received by each ¿rm in a given district and sector are all equally
informative, thantheunweightedaverageadjustmentisadequatetosummarizetheinformation
contained in the decisions of others if the information content of the signals differs across
¿rms (increasing with size, say), then weighted averages may be preferable. Given that one of
the de¿ning characteristics of industrial districts is the predominance of small ¿rms, and that
the choice of weights contains a degree of arbitrariness, for the time being we use unweighted
averages.
To account for unobserved variables that may be relevant to factor adjustment, we
estimate a ¿xed-effects model. Obviously, the ¿xed effects will also pick up any unobservable
variablethat iscommontoall¿rms in agiven district-sector and does not vary overtime. Table
3, Column 1 shows the results of parameter estimates for the simplest speci¿cation, which
only includes controls for aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks and the adjustment of similar
and observable ¿rms, i.e. those located in the same district and sector.
21 Both aggregate
and ¿rm-speci¿c shocks have a positive and highly signi¿cant impact on factor adjustment,
though idiosyncratic shocks are economically twice as important as aggregate shocks (the
estimated coef¿cients are 0.056 and 0.026 respectively). The estimates show that each ¿rm’s
factor adjustment is positively and signi¿cantly affected by the adjustment of the other ¿rms
in the same district and sector (coef¿cient = 0.308 | statistic = 5.61): an average increase
in employment of one percent by the ¿rms in the reference group leads to a response of
approximately a third of a point by each other ¿rm in the group. This is a remarkable effect
and is clearly consistent with the idea that ¿rms rely heavily on the information contained in
the actions of other, similar ¿rms.
Other interpretations are possible, however. In particular, it may be that our proxy
for common shocks is imperfect and that the average adjustment is picking up unexplained
time-varying sector-district shocks rather than true information spillovers. To address this
problem we add to the regression two explanatory variables: ¿rst, for each ¿rm  and year
54 The number of workers employed is a piece of information not required for the balance sheet, but supplied
in addition to it. As a consequence, the records may not always be accurate and outliers may be present. To take
care of outliers we have excluded observations with a tenfold increase in employment or with a decrease in real
sales accompanied by a twofold increase in employment. This led us to exclude 372 observations on the total
of district and nondistrict ¿rms. Since we use the change in employment as our left-hand side variable, we lose
some observations with respect to those reported in Table 2 adding those lost due to missing values, we are left
with the sample of 17,456 observations, for district ¿rms and 34,795 for non-district ¿rms.22
| in the sample we compute the average (unweighted) adjustment of ¿rms located in RWKHU
GLVWULFWV but in the VDPH VHFWRU as ¿rm .
22 Second, for the same ¿rm  and all years, we
compute the average adjustment of ¿rms located in the VDPH GLVWULFW as ¿rm  but belonging
to sectors RWKHU than that of . If our measure of adjustment by ¿rms in reference group is
picking up unaccounted sector shocks or district-speci¿c shocks, these two variables should
absorb part of the effect and the estimate of the reference group adjustment should diminish
in both magnitude and signi¿cance. On the other hand, if our controls are correctly picking
up aggregate sector-district shocks and the reference group adjustment reÀects information
spillovers, the two additional regressors should have no explanatory power. In the case of
the ¿rst indicator this is so because, since it refers to ¿rms located in other districts, it
does not ful¿ll the observability requirement for the second, non-sector ¿rms, because it
does not ful¿ll the similarity requirement. Finally, we include as an additional regressor the
average adjustment of non-district ¿rms in the same sector as ¿rm : if actions by others only
affect one’s decision through information spillovers, this variable should not be statistically
signi¿cant. The results of the estimates are shown in Column 2 of Table 3. The parameters
of the aggregate and speci¿c shocks are essentially unaffected, as is that of the adjustment
by ¿rms in the reference group, which is only slightly smaller (0.287 compared to 0.308)
and equally signi¿cant. None of the other measures of adjustment included in the regression
(by ¿rms in other districts, those in other sectors, or non-district ¿rms in the same sector) has
explanatory value. They all have small and statistically insigni¿cant coef¿cients whether taken
alone or as a group (the group test for the hypothesis that they are jointly equal to zero has a
group-value of 0.578).
There is yet another explanation for these results. As shown in Table 2, district ¿rms
tend to have a relatively high degree of sectoral concentration when measured at four-digit
levels. If a shock hits the particular class of goods in which the district is specialized, then
one should expect that the adjustment of ¿rms out of district has little explanatory power,
because such ¿rms are not as specialized in the same goods. To account for this possibility,
we further restrict the de¿nition of sector when selecting the control group. For each district,
we retain the ¿rms in the modal four-digit sector and, if this has less than 50 percent of the
55 To calculate the adjustment of ¿rms in other districts, for sectors with multiple districts we con¿ne our-
selves to the districts already included in the sample for the two sectors with only one district, we must resort to
the districts that are not in the sample, given that the “same sector, other districts” set within sample is empty.23
¿rms, all ¿rms in any other four-digit sector with at least 25 percent of ¿rms. For ¿rms in
these sectors, we then construct the adjustment of non-reference ¿rms (in other districts or out
of districts) within the narrower sector de¿nition. For reference group ¿rms, we maintain the
same measure of adjustment as before, based on the coarser sector de¿nition. From a sectoral
classi¿cation viewpoint, there is now more heterogeneity in the reference group ¿rms than in
the non-reference group ones, which implies that, if our previous results are driven by a shock
to a particular class of goods, then the adjustment of the non-reference group should be at least
as important as that of the reference group. The results are reported in Column 3 of Table
3. The coef¿cient of the adjustment of the reference group drops slightly, arguably for the
higher heterogeneity however, the adjustment of non-reference group ¿rms still fail to have
any impact, suggesting that our results are not driven by the higher similarity among district
¿rms, and that proximity is indeed a necessary condition for the effects that we ¿nd.
So far we have assumed that what matters for ¿rm M decisions is current actions of the
¿rms in the reference group. Some papers assume an information (or observation) lag. It may
thus be argued that the relevant actions are those of the past actions. This is obviously an
empirical problem, and we address it in Column (4) where we include the one-year lagged
adjustment by reference group ¿rms as well as current adjustment. The estimates show that
lagged adjustment has no explanatory value when current adjustment is included, perhaps
because we are using low-frequency data.
Finally, Column 5 of Table 3 reports the basic regression for non-district ¿rms. We take
as the reference group for these ¿rms all other non-district ¿rms in the same sector. Since
no restriction is put on location, ¿rm M and the ¿rms in its reference group will on average
be located far apart and the observability requirement will not be ful¿lled. Consequently, if
information spillovers are the reason why other ¿rms’ actions affect ¿rm M’s decisions, the
adjustment of others should have no effect when equation (4) is estimated on the sample of
non-district ¿r m s .A n dt h i si sw h a tw e¿ nd: while the measures of aggregate and idiosyncratic
shocks are both signi¿cant and with coef¿cients comparable to those found for district ¿rms,
the adjustment by other non-district ¿rms in the same sector as ¿rm M has a small coef¿cient,
with the wrong sign and not statistically different from zero. Taken together, these results are
remarkably consistent with the idea that ¿rms’ actions reveal valuable information to other
¿rms in their district and industry.24
 5REXVWQHVV DQG H[WHQVLRQV
7.1 5HDFWLRQ WR ODUJH DGMXVWPHQWV
If the revelation of information is what drives the results in Table 3, then one should
expect the entire distribution of adjustments by others, not only its mean, to matter. Moreover,
as is argued in Section 3, in the presence of adjustment costs extreme adjustments are likely
to convey more information. While small changes in the labor force may reÀect “business
as usual”, the observation of a ¿rm undergoing a dramatic change in manning levels could
have a stronger inÀuence on the information set of the competitors and thus prompt emulation.
To allow for this possibility, we calculate the 10|￿ and 90|￿ percentiles of the distribution
of the adjustments by ¿rms in the reference group and in other control groups and estimate
equation (4) using these variables as proxies for other ¿rms’ adjustment. Table 4 shows the
results.
23 Column 1 gives the estimates for the simplest speci¿cation: both the 10|￿ and the
90|￿ percentiles have a positive impact on ¿rms’ decisions. Although the parameters are likely
to be imprecisely estimated given the high collinearity of the regressors (expected when the
distribution of adjustments moves symmetrically), an ) test rejects the hypothesis that the two
v a r i a b l e sa r ej o i n t l ye q u a lt oz e r oe v e na tt h e1p e r c e n tl e v e lo fc o n ¿ dence. Notice also that
the upper tail carries a larger coef¿cient and is more signi¿cant than the lower tail. This could
be because our dataset does not record exits, potentially a fundamental source of information,
whereas start-ups with their strong increase in employment, are in the sample.
The use of quintiles also allows us to perform an indirect comparative test of the
information-based versus the “real” effects-based explanation of the signi¿cance of the
adjustment of others. If the adjustment of other ¿rms is reÀecting “real” spillovers, due for
example to technological externalities that increase all ¿rms’ productivity, then one should
expect that what matters is the average adjustment if on the contrary it is mainly due to
information spillovers, and if the most extreme adjustments convey the most information, then
one should expect the extreme quintiles to be more important for the size of the adjustment.
We accordingly run a regression that includes both the mean and the top and bottom quintiles
of the distribution of the adjustment of others. The results, shown in Column 2 of Table 4,
are clear-cut: adding a measure of central tendency, such as the average adjustment, has no
56 As is argued in Section 4, with nonlinear measures of adjustments the identi¿cation problem does not
arise. For comparability, and given that they are signi¿cant, we include the proxies for liquidity constraints also
in this set of regressions.25
explanatory value once the two extreme quintiles are present. This is strong evidence that the
phenomenon cannot be explained by real factors.
Column 3 shows the estimates including adjustment by non-reference groups, measured
by the 10|￿ and 90|￿ percentiles. The inclusion of the corresponding measures of adjustment
in these other groups makes the estimate of the effect of the lower tail in the reference group
smaller and less precise but does not affect that of the upper tail. Three out of six coef¿cients
of the added regressors have the wrong (negative) sign and only the 10|￿ percentile of ¿rms
outside districts is signi¿cantly different from zero at 10 percent (but not at 5 percent). In
addition the hypothesis that they are jointly equal to zero cannot be rejected by an 8-t e s t
( R -value = 0.246).
Finally, Column 4 runs the regression for non-district ¿rms with the 10|￿ and 90|￿
percentiles in the adjustment of other non-district ¿rms. In this case, the 10|￿ percentile has
a large and signi¿cant coef¿cient but the 90|￿ percentile is not signi¿cant and has the wrong
sign.
The results using the adjustment in the tails of the distribution con¿rm those using
average adjustment however, they also strengthen the interpretation of the results in terms
of information spillovers.
7.2 )UDFWLRQ RI ¿UPV DGMXVWLQJ
To further assess the robustness of our results we estimate our basic regressions using a
third measure of other ¿rms’ actions, namely the share that change employment by more than
a given threshold amount. As is shown by Chamley and Gale (1996), in certain circumstances
the share of ¿rms that adjust can be taken as a suf¿cient statistic of other ¿rms’ actions:
the higher the share that raises or lowers the factor of production above or below a certain
threshold, the stronger the signal. To test this implication we replace the adjustment of others
by the share of ¿rms that increase or decrease staff by 25 percent or more. When these
shares refer to the reference group, we expect the former variable to exert a positive effect
on the adjustment of the ¿rm, the latter a negative effect. When the shares refer to non-
reference groups, there should be no statistically signi¿cant effect. The results, shown in Table
5, are fully consistent with these predictions: the share of reference group ¿rms that lower
employment by more than 25 percent affects the adjustment of a given ¿rm negatively and26
signi¿cantly: the effect of the share of ¿rms that raise employment by more than 25 percent
is positive (and more pronounced, Column 1). Adding the mean adjustment in the group
provides no increment in explanatory power (Column 2). However, when the adjustments of
all the other non-reference groups are inserted, we fail to formally reject the assumption that,
taken together, their coef¿cients are equal to zero (R-value for the test = 0.033). But notice
that some coef¿cients have the wrong sign and that four out of the six coef¿cients are not
statistically different from zero. Finally, running the regression among non-district ¿rms, we
obtain results very similar to those of the previous table, with the lower measure of adjustment
signi¿cantly different from zero and the higher measure showing the wrong sign (Column 4).
Thus, overall, these results are not qualitatively different from those reported in Table 3 and
Table 4.
7.3 (YLGHQFH IURP LQGLYLGXDO VHFWRUV
The estimates reported so far restrict the effect of the adjustment of ¿rms in the reference
group to be the same across the ¿ve sectors in the sample. Yet it could be that information
spillovers are relevant only in some sectors, such as those producing virtually the same goods
or those where goods, even if not similar, are highly complementary in demand so that ¿rms
are subject to the same aggregate shocks. If this were the case, ¿rms could learn even by
observing the decisions of other ¿rms producing different but related goods. Though we have
been careful to select sectors that group similar or related goods, our procedure is judgmental
and potentially arbitrary. It could be that the results for the whole sample are driven by
particularly strong informational interactions among the ¿rms of just one sector. We check
this possibility in Table 6, which reports the estimate of the basic speci¿cation for each of the
¿vesectors. In eachcase we reportthespeci¿cationwithonlytheadjustment ofthe¿rmsinthe
referencegroupand alsothatwith theothergroups, usingthemeantocapturetheadjustmentof
others. When only the reference group is included, its coef¿cient is always positive the point
estimate in the “textile”, “leather & footwear” and “production tools” sectors is comparable to
that of the entire sample (0.406, 0.461, and 0.260 respectively compared to 0.308) and always
statistically signi¿cant. It is smaller (0.087) but signi¿cant for “construction materials and
glass” and not statistically signi¿cant for the ¿rms producing “wood & furniture”. Adding the
adjustment ofother¿rms not in thereference group adds noexplanatoryvalue totheregression
except for “wood & furniture” where we cannot reject the hypothesis that the adjustment of27
non-reference group ¿rms matters (R-value for the test = 0.0033). If we take these results at
face value, spillovers seem to be stronger in the “light industry” sectors, probably because they
produce a more homogeneous set of goods.
 )LUP VL]H DQG VHQVLWLYLW\ WR VRFLDO OHDUQLQJ
Presumably, different ¿rms will react in different ways to the information contained
in the actions of others. Some ¿rms may not rely, or need rely less, on the observation of
others’ actions to extract information because they already receive enough signals thus, they
may attach little weight to the information conveyed by the decisions of others. These are
presumably the larger ¿rms, which are likely to have both more private information and a
better capacity to process it. Furthermore, if there are ¿xed costs of gathering and processing
signals, larger ¿rms have more incentive to incur them, because any advantage coming from
new information would apply to a larger output. Finally, larger ¿rms probably have access to
a larger network than smaller ¿rms to gather information, which makes them less sensitive to
local information spillovers. It is thus conceivable that the degree of reliance on neighboring
¿rms’ actions decreases as ¿rm size increases. To test this hypothesis we split the sample of
district ¿rms by size and run our basic speci¿cation for each quartile. The results, reported
in Table 7, are supportive of the foregoing: the effect of reference group adjustment, while
positive and signi¿cant for all size groups, declines monotonically with the size of the ¿rm.
Taking the ¿rst and the last quartile, the difference in impact is substantial: among ¿rms in
the ¿rst quartile the impact of the adjustment of others is more than three times as great as
among ¿rms in the fourth quartile (0.679 compared to 0.177). For the middle two quartiles
the coef¿cient is in between these two extremes, around 0.3, close to that for the sample as a
whole.
 $PSOL¿FDWLRQ RI DJJUHJDWH VKRFNV
We argued in Section 2 that information spillovers offer a natural mechanism of
ampli¿cation of aggregate shocks. The endogenous pace of information revelation can in
fact be speeded up in nonlinear fashion by shocks that break the inertial behavior induced by
social learning. Schivardi (1998) applies this idea to explain the surge in job destruction that
we observe at the troughs (Davis et al. 1996), showing how relatively small aggregate shocks
can induce a burst of reallocation if they set in motion the process of information-revealing28
actions. The implication in terms of the two groups of ¿rms considered - i.e. district and non-
district ¿rms - is that ¿rms that are subject to information spillovers should tend to concentrate
adjustments in certain periods while the control group should follow a smoother pattern of
labor adjustment. To test the validity of this implication we identify a series of periods,
which we call “adjustment years”, in which adjustment intensity is particularly strong. If the
predictions of the model are correct, we should ¿nd that district ¿rms have lower sensitivity to
aggregateshocksinnon-adjustmentyearsandhigherinadjustmentyears, becausethoseshould
be the years in which the response to shocks is ampli¿ed by information Àows. Non-district
¿rms should show no substantial differences, since for them all that matters is presumably the
observation of the shocks.
We identify adjustment years relying on out-of-sample information. We use the data
from ISDB, a database constructed by the OECD that contains information on factors of
production and output value at the sector level for a set of OECD countries. We select payroll
employment for Italy from 1970 to 1996 for four sectors: “textiles, apparel and leather ”
24
“wood” “production tools and metal products excluding machinery” “non-metallic mineral
products”. For each, we calculate the average annual percentage changes in employment,
classifying as “adjustment years” those in which the sector recorded an employment increase
or decrease larger than the period mean plus one standard deviation. By this de¿nition, the
adjustment years are 1983-84, 1988, and 1992-93 for “textiles and leather” 1983-85 and
1993 for “wood” 1984-87 and 1992-93 for “metal products” 1983-89 and 1991 for “non-
metallic mineral products”
25. All the adjustments except “wood” in 1985, textiles in 1988 and
“non-metallic mineral products” in 1986-89 were downward, in line with the downtrend of
employment in manufacturing over the period.
26 We then construct a dummy that, for each
¿rm-year observation, is equal to one if the observation falls in an adjustment year for the
relevant sector and zero otherwise. Finally, we interact this dummy with the aggregate shock,
57 The dataset does not distinguish between textiles and leather, so we have to aggregate these two sectors.
58 Themorevolatileandlesscorrelatedbehaviorof“non-metallicmineralproducts”isinlinewiththegreater
cyclical sensitivity and the cyclical misalignment of the construction sector, to which it is closely linked.
59 We have experimented with stricter de¿nitions of adjustment years, broadening the band outside which
the change in employment must lie (and therefore reducing the number of adjustment years) up to the mean plus
or minus 1.5 times the standard deviation. Our results are robust to such changes.29
distinguishing between district and non-district ¿rms and estimate the following equation:
?￿| ' K￿"E|_?@c_ n K2"E|_@c_ n K￿"E|_?@c?_ n Ke"E|_@c?_ n KD"￿E|n ￿E |  (9)
where _%c+ is a dummy taking value 1 if the observation is in year % (%=[ @(adjustment) ?@
(non-adjustment)]) and location + (+ =[ _ (district) ?_ (non-district)]) and zero otherwise.
The theory implies that K￿ 	K 2( ¿ rms exposed to information spillovers respond more to
aggregateshocks inadjustmentyears), K￿ 	K ￿( ¿ rms exposedtoinformationspilloversareless
responsive to aggregate shocks in non-adjustment years), K2 :K e(exposed ¿rms respond more
than non-exposed ¿rms in adjustment years), and K￿ ' Ke (no difference in responsiveness to
aggregate shocks among non-exposed ¿rms). The estimation results are reported in Table
8. The point estimates (Column 1) support the predictions. The response of district ¿rms
to aggregate shocks is three times as great in adjustment than non-adjustment years (0.072 YV
0.023), implying that the effects of the shocks are greatly ampli¿ed. The coef¿cient for district
¿rms in non-adjustment years (0.023) is smaller than that of non-district ¿rms (0.059). The
latter, in turn, is smaller than that of district ¿rms in adjustment years (0.072). Tests of equality
of the coef¿cients reported at the bottom of the table at least partly con¿rm this conclusion,
with only the test of the null hypothesis that district ¿rms have a higher response than non-
district in adjustment years being rejected. Furthermore, we cannot reject the hypothesis that
the response to aggregate shocks for non-district ¿rms is the same in adjustment and non-
adjustment years (i.e. that K￿ ' Ke), as theory suggests.
Since the de¿nition of adjustment years is somewhat arbitrary both in sample period and
in threshold, we have checked our results de¿ning only 1993 as an adjustment year. In 1993
the Italian economy recorded the sharpest rate of job destruction since the Second World War
and a record contraction in manufacturing employment, common to all industries as we have
seen, the previous procedure indicates 1993 as an adjustment year for all sectors except “non-
metallic mineral products”. The estimates, reported in Column 4 of Table 8, are very similar
to those obtained when all adjustment years are used however, in this case we fail to reject
the hypothesis that, for exposed ¿rms, the response in 1993 is the same as in the other years
(i.e.that K￿ ' K2).
27
5: This is probably because in this case the parameter of the adjustment year is estimated with fewer ob-
servations (and therefore less precisely) moreover, while restricting the de¿nition of adjustment years to 199330
Our test of the implications of information spillovers for the sensitivity of factor
adjustment to aggregate shocks can be honed still more ¿nely. If the extra response to shocks
thatweobserveinadjustmentyearsfordistrict¿rmsisindeedduetosociallearning, thenwhen
we control for the adjustment of others this effect should decrease or disappear (implying that
K￿ ' K2) . We accordingly estimate equation (8) on the subgroup of district ¿rms we then
run the same regressions including the average adjustment of other ¿rms in the same district
and sector. The results are reported in Columns 2 and 3 using all adjustment years and in
Columns 5 and 6 using only 1993. Whatever the adjustment year, we ¿nd a sizable decline
in the difference between the coef¿cients when the adjustment of others is included in the
regression. Formal tests of equality of the coef¿cients, however, do not give qualitatively
different results, although the test statistics do change in the expected direction. This lends
support to the idea that the adjustment of others is responsible for the extra response of ¿rms
to aggregate shocks in adjustment years, and that information spillovers constitute a relevant
channel of ampli¿cation of shocks.
 5HIHUHQFH JURXS VWUXFWXUH DQG OHDUQLQJ
In this section we extend the analysis to inquire how the structure of the reference group
affects learning. It is intuitive that if a group of ¿rms tends to behave similarly because they
learn from one another, then they should end up performing similarly. It is also plausible that
the structure and amount of learning that takes place may depend on the structure of the group.
Bala and Goyal (1998) formalize these intuitions using a framework where¿rms (agents) learn
from their neighbors’ actions and outcomes as well as from the past records of their choices.
They study how the social structure affects the long-run performance of a group of connected
¿rms
28 and the nature of the learning process. They show that similar, informationally
connected ¿rms end up undertaking the same actions and, at the limit, performing similarly.
Obviously, this does not imply that the action chosen by all members of the connected group
is the optimal action it only implies that it is chosen by all. Yet, depending on the structure
guarantees that we are selecting a true adjustment year, it also implies that the other years might include both ad-
justment and non-adjustment years. This will tend to bias the test towards ¿nding no difference in sensitivity to
aggregate shocks.
5; According to Bala and Goyal (1998), ¿rms in a group are connected if for every pair of ¿rms l and m,
either l directly observes m or there exist ¿rms l4>===>lp such that l directly observes l4, which directly observes
l5>===>lp, which directly observes m.31
of the group, ¿rms may end up choosing the pro¿t-maximizing action. Bala and Goyal (1998)
show that this is more likely to happen if the reference group is large and if there are no
informationally dominant ¿rms, i.e. ¿rms whose actions are observed by all other ¿rms in the
group. On oneside, more ¿rm sinag ro u psim p lym ea n st h a tmo r ein f o r ma ti o nc anb eg a t h e re d
by observing the behavior of others on the other, if the group contains one or a few dominant
players, ¿rms may end up being trapped into a sub-optimal action. The intuition behind this
result is that, since a dominant player is observed by all other members of the group, each
member will tend to emulate him, disregarding his own private information, in the spirit of an
information cascade. As a consequence, the process of information revelation and diffusion is
impaired, and the private information of agents is not revealed ef¿ciently.
We can use our data to test this hypothesis. It implies that each ¿rm’s performance
should be positively correlated with the number of other ¿rms in the district and negatively
with the weight of informationally dominant actors (large ¿r m s ) .W eu s et h es a m p l eo fd i s t r i c t
¿ rms. For each district we compute the number of specialized ¿rms in each year and construct
an indicator of information leadership as the share of the three largest ¿rms’ sales in those
of the reference group (i.e. the total sales of the ¿rms in that district that are present in our
sample). As an alternativemeasure, weusethe95th percentile of sales divided by median sales
in the district. We measure performance as gross pro¿ts over total assets. We then regress
this measure of pro¿tability on the number of specialized ¿rms, the proxy for information
leadership, and a full set of year dummies, sector dummies and regional dummies as controls
for performance shocks. If the theoretical prediction is correct, a higher concentration of sales
should have a negative effect on pro¿tability and a higher number of ¿rms a positive one.
Since pro¿tability can change systematically with the size of the ¿r m ,w ea l s oi n s e r tas e to f
size dummies, one for each quartile of sales. Results are shown in Table 9. The ¿rst two
columns report estimates using a ¿xed-effects estimator to account for ¿rms’ heterogeneity in
performance. The ¿rst column shows the estimates when the information leadership proxy is
the sales of the largest three ¿rms the second, when it is the ratio between the 95th percentile
and the median. In both cases the results are as expected: the coef¿cient of the number of
¿rms in the district is positive and signi¿cant and that of the proxy for information leadership
is negative and signi¿cant, implying that the performance of ¿rms in districts with dominant
players is systematically worse than that of ¿rms in districts without dominant players, in line
with Bala and Goyal (1998). Furthermore, the effect of dominant players is economically32
meaningful: increasing the ratio between the 95th percentile of sales and the median by 10
percent starting from its sample mean lowers pro¿tability by 1.2 percentage points, almost
10 percent of its mean value
29. Since our measure of performance is characterized by the
presence of several extreme observations on both tails, we have also run our estimates using a
least absolute deviations estimator omitting ¿xed effects. The results, shown in the third and
fourth columns of Table 9, are very similar to those of the ¿rst two columns, reassuring us that
the foregoing conclusions are robust to the presence of outliers.
 &RQFOXVLRQV
We have exploited a rich dataset on a sample of Italian manufacturing ¿rms to assess
whether information spillovers are an important factor in determining labor adjustment
decisions. Using the concepts of product similarity and geographical proximity to identify
as e to f¿ rms that are more likely to be exposed to information spillovers, we have shown
that, after controlling for aggregate and individual shocks, ¿rms’ adjustments in labor are
strongly inÀuenced by various measures of aggregate adjustment within the reference group.
In addition, we ¿nd that large adjustments tend to induce a proportionally stronger response,
arguably because they are more visible. We have also shown that the adjustments of ¿rms that
fail to satisfy either of the criteria have no impact on individual adjustments.
In accordance with the predictions of the theory on strategic learning, we have found that
information spillovers tend to induce concentration of adjustments in some periods, which
we have de¿ned as adjustment years, suggesting that they actually constitute a powerful
mechanism of ampli¿cation of aggregate shocks. Finally, we have investigated the impact
of the structure of the reference group on the learning process, showing that an increase in
the number of ¿rms in the reference group has a positive impact on pro¿tability, while the
presence of large ¿rms might be a barrier to the ef¿cient dissemination of information and
therefore reduce average pro¿tability.
The analysis can be extended in many different directions. We plan to study the
implication of IS in terms of co-movements of factor demands more directly, by considering
how the individual hazard functions for factor adjustments are inÀuenced by social learning.
A second extension we plan to pursue relates to the estimation of the rate at which such effects
5< For this computation we are using the estimates in column 2 of Table 9.33
fade with distance, to assess how “local” spillovers actually are. This would imply relating the
adjustment of ¿rms in a district to that of ¿rms in other districts, controlling for the distance
betweenthem. Finally, it would beimportantto furtherinvestigatetheeffects ofsociallearning
on ¿rms’ performance. This would help to better assess the implications of spillovers for
industrial policy, particularly for phenomena in which information plays an important role,
such as the diffusion of technological innovation, the entry into a new market, or the early
phase of development of a new industry in a region.Table 1
   SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE WHOLE SAMPLE










Sample Population Sample Population Sample Population
1) Food, beverage & tobacco 7.2 5.5 27.8 24.9 16 17
2) Textile &  clothing 36.3 38.1 36.7 40.3 65 69
3) Leather & footwear 41.9 39.4 40.7 41.3 26 27
4) Timber, construction materials
and glass
 24.6 20.8  37.6 35.2 39 39
5)Metallurgy and metal products
except machines
 0.4 0.3   62.5 17.6 1 1
6)Machinery, computers & tools 13.3 14.4 47.7 49.9 30 32
7) Rubber, plastic & chemical
products
 2.1 3.1 26.8 19.2 4 4
8) Paper, printing & publishing  1.4 1.6 43.5 23.4 6 6
9) Other manufacturing  34.7 52.2 13.5 20.8 4 4
Total 14.3 17.6 38.5 41.3 191 199






with at least 30
specialized
firms: 1991





1) Food, beverage & tobacco 9.8 1 2,211 26,076 High
2) Textile &  clothing 23.0 9 19,102 21,911 Medium
3) Leather & footwear 21.6 4 6,605 6,974 Low
4) Wood, construction
materials and glass
12.7 5 5,751 13,330 Medium
5)Metallurgy and metal
products except machines
3 0 50 8,664 High
6)Machinery, computers &
tools
45.3 13 19,977 76,646 High
7) Rubber, plastic & chemical
products
18.2 1 1,125 34,235 Medium
8) Paper, printing & publishing 4.3 0 343 16,134 High
9) Other manufacturing 21.5 1 1,154 1,908 High
Total 22.7 34 56,318 205,878
Specialized district firms are those located in the district and belonging to the sector.Table  2











































Biella (wool) North 76 79.00 7.73 1,198 0.089 0.11 60.5  (1710) 28
Cossato (wool) North 59 112.86 8.74 951 0.094 0.18 55.9  (1710) 13
B.Arsizio North 97 87.49 5.79 1,498 0.090 0.13 28.9  (1730) 226
Gallarate North 60 73.38 6.76 836 0.094 0.09 31.7  (1770) 99
Como (silk) North 187 61.95 3.73 2,657 0.108 0.06 32.6  (1724) 218
Prato (wool) Center 329 25.78 4.81 4,250 0.119 0.08 54.4  (1710) 38





Center 220 20.76 3.36 2,550 0.111 0.38 77.3  (1910) 37
Wood &
furniture
Desio North 99 59.24 4.25 1,225 0.102 0.09 79.6 (3610) 262
Udine (chairs) North 53 72.75 6.75 889 0.096 0.07 73.6 (3610) 132
Pesaro
(furniture)
Center 41 55.27 3.1 577 0.087 0.16 95.1 (3610) 36
Total 193 62.11 4.38 2,691 0.096 0.11 80.8 (3610) 430
Construcion
materials
Sassuolo (tiles) Center 96 142.77 10.17 1,388 0.094 0.08 53.1 (2620) 190
Tools
Lecco North 82 61.41 5.31 1,162 0.137 0.08 40.2 (2870) 157
Bergamo North 48 55.17 3.36 651 0.156 0.11 37.5 (2850) 226
Padova North 38 55.76 3.19 552 0.104 0.11 34.2 (2870) 154
Total 168 58.35 3.64 2,365 0.132 0.10 31.6 (2870) 537
NON-DISTRICT FIRMS
Textile 538 99.34 8.70 7,592 0.095 0.09 21.2 (1710)
Leather & foot. 234 71.99 6.31 3,371 0.0.91 0.11 52.6 (1930)
Timber & furn. 533 54.16 5.84 7,180 0.094 0.09 51.2 (3610)
Constr.
Materials
836 80.97 9.84 11,048 0.110 0.11 32.3 (2660)
Tools 1,005 61.95 5.80 12,831 0.100 0.13 30.8 (2810)
Total 3,146 42,022Table  3
   EMPLOYMENT ADJUSTMENT AND INFORMATION SPILLOVERS: FULL SAMPLE ESTIMATES
Explanatory variables District firms Non-district
firms





















Average adjustment by other firms
in:








 - the same distr. and sect. (t-1) -0.019
 (0.057)












Average adjustment by other non-









Number of observations 17,456 17,456 10,914 16,407 34,795
Number of firms 2,308 2,308 1477 2,295 4,896












p-value for the F test for
adjustment by non-reference group
firms = 0
0.578 0.912 0.852
The left-hand side variable is the firm’s percentage change in employment. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions
include firm fixed effects. Aggregate shocks are the coefficients of the year-dummies in a regressions of the standardized rate of growth
of real sales among district firms (respectively non-district for the estimates reported in column (5)) belonging to the same sector on a
set of year-region dummies; specific shocks are the residuals from this regression. The adjustment by other firms is the unweighted
average of the percentage change in employment among the firms in the reference group; when the reference group is the same as the
firm in the left-hand side, the adjustment of the latter is excluded when computing the average adjustment. Column (3) reports the
results for a subgroup of firms for which the adjustment for the non-reference group has been calculated using a finer (4-digit)
definition of  “same sector”, while maintaining the same measure of adjustment as before for the reference group. All regressions
include two controls for liquidity constraints measured  by the firm’s cash flow as a share of total sales and interacting this measure
with two dummies, one for non-positive and the other for non-negative adjustments.Table 4
   EMPLOYMENT ADJUSTMENT AND INFORMATION SPILLOVERS: ESTIMATES WITH
PERCENTILES OF ADJUSTMENT. WHOLE SAMPLE OF DISTRICT FIRMS
Explanatory variables District firms Non-district firms

















Adjustment measures by other firms :
A: Firms in the same district and sector














     - Mean adjustment: same district and sector 0.053
(0.092)
B: Firms in other districts, same sector
    - 10th percentile -0.040
(0.070)
    - 90th percentile -0.061
(0.056)
C: Firms in same districts, other sector
   - 10th percentile 0.050
(0.026)
   - 90th percentile -0.007
(0.017)
D: Non-districts firms, same sector








Number of observations 17,456 17,456 17,456 34,795
Number of firms 2,308 2,308 2,308 4,896










p-value for the F test for adjustment by non-
reference group firms = 0
0.246
The left-hand side variable is the firm’s percentage change in employment. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions
include firm fixed effects. Aggregate shocks are the coefficients of the year-dummies in a regressions of the standardized rate of growth of
real sales among district firms  belonging to the same sector on a set of year-region dummies; specific shocks are the residuals from this
regression. The adjustment by other firms is measured by various moments of the distribution of the percentage change in employment in
each sample year among the firms in the reference group; when the reference group is the same as the firm in the left-hand side, the
adjustment of the latter is excluded when computing the adjustment by other firms. All regressions include two controls for liquidity
constraints measured  by the firm’s cash flow as a share of total sales and interacting this measure with two dummies, one for positive and
the other for negative adjustments.Table 5
EMPLOYMENT ADJUSTMENT AND INFORMATION SPILLOVERS: ESTIMATES WITH
FRACTION OF FIRMS ADJUSTING. WHOLE SAMPLE OF DISTRICT FIRMS
Explanatory variables District firms Non-district
firms

















Adjustment by other firms :












     mean adjustment:  same
     district and sector
0.129
(0.091)
-25%, other district and same sector 0.170
(0.137)
+25%, other district and same sector -0.172
(0.120)
-25%, same district and other sector -0.064
(0.058)
+25%, same district and other sector 0.082
(0.046)








Number of observations 17,456 17,456 17,456 34,795
Number of firms 2,308 2,308 2,308 4,896










p-value for the F test for adjustment by
non-reference group firms = 0
0.033
The left-hand side variable is the firm’s percentage change in employment. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions
include firm fixed effects. Aggregate shocks are the coefficients of the year-dummies in a regressions of the standardized rate of growth
of real sales among district firms belonging to the same sector on a set of year-region dummies; specific shocks are the residuals from
this regression. The adjustment by other firms is measured by the share of firms in the reference group that in each sample year adjust
employment by more than 25 percent and by less than 25 percent respectively; when the reference group is the same as the firm in the
left-hand side, the adjustment of the latter is excluded when computing the share of firms that adjust in excess of |25| percent. All
regressions include two controls for liquidity constraints measured  by the firm’s cash flow as a share of total sales and interacting this
measure with two dummies, one for positive and the other for negative adjustments.Table 6
 EMPLOYMENT ADJUSTMENT AND INFORMATION SPILLOVERS: ESTIMATES BY
SECTOR FOR DISTRICT FIRMS
Explanatory variable Sector
Textile Leather & footwear Wood & furniture Construction
materials
Tools









































Average adjustment by other
firms in:














































Average adjustment by other












Number of observations 9,731 9,731 2,164 2,164 2,336 2,336 1,200 1,200 2,025 2,025
Number of firms 1,270 1,270 301 301 296 296 148 148 293 293






















p value for the F test for  the
adjustment of other non-
reference group firms = 0
0.576 0.849 0.003 0.549 0.676
The left-hand side variable is the firm’s percentage change in employment. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions
include firm fixed effects. Aggregate shocks are the coefficients of the year-dummies in a regression of the standardized rate of growth of
real sales among district firms belonging to the same sector on a set of year-region dummies; specific shocks are the residuals from this
regression. The adjustment by other firms is the unweighted average of the percentage change in employment among the firms in the
reference group; when the reference group is the same as that of the firm in the left-hand side, the adjustment of the latter is excluded when
computing the average adjustment. All regressions include two controls for liquidity constraints measured  by the firm’s cash flow as a
share of total sales and interacting this measure with two dummies, one for positive and the other for negative adjustments.Table  7
   FIRMS SIZE AND THE INTENSITY OF SOCIAL LEARNING
Explanatory variables Firm size quartile






















Average adjustment by other firms in:








Number of observations 4,522 4,332 4,235 4,367
Number of firms 949 929 835 637










The left-hand side variable is the firm’s percentage change in employment. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions
include firm fixed effects. Aggregate shocks are the coefficients of the year-dummies in a regressions of the standardized rate of growth
of real sales among district firms (respectively non-district for the estimates reported in column (4)) belonging to the same sector on a
set of year-region dummies; specific shocks are the residuals from this regression. The adjustment by other firms is the unweigthed
average of the percentage change in employment among the firms in the reference group; when the reference group is the same as the
firm in the left-hand side, the adjustment of the latter is excluded when computing the average adjustment.Table 8
   EMPLOYMENT ADJUSTMENT AND INFORMATION SPILLOVERS: ESTIMATES OF EXTRA
 RESPONSE IN ADJUSTMENT YEARS. WHOLE SAMPLE
Explanatory variables Adjustment years: all Adjustment year:1993
All firms District firms All firms District firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aggregate shocks, district firms in non













Aggregate shocks, district firms in













Aggregate shocks, non-district firms in





Aggregate shocks, non-district firms in





Average adjustment by other firms in the same

















Number of observations 52,308 17,471 17,471 52,308 17,471 17,471
Number of firms 7,204 2,308 2,308 7,204 2,308 2,308














TESTS OF HYPOTHESES: p-values for the F test of the specified null hypotheses
Regression (1):  H0: b1= b2: p-value = 0.001; H0: b1= b3: p-value =0.002;
 H0: b2= b3: p-value = 0.364; H0: b3= b4: p-value = 0.357.
Regression (2): H0: b1= b2: p-value = 0.006.
Regression (3): H0: b1= b2: p-value = 0.014.
Regression (4): H0: b1= b2: p-value = 0.339; H0: b1= b3: p-value = 0.003;
H0: b2= b3: p-value = 0.773; H0: b3= b4: p-value = 0.376.
Regression (5): H0: b1= b2: p-value = 0.296.
Regression (6): H0: b1= b2: p-value = 0.571.
The left-hand side variable is the firm’s percentage change in employment. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions
include firm fixed effects. Estimates are obtained by constructing interaction dummies that let the coefficients of the aggregate shocks
differ according to district-non district and adjustment year-non adjustment year. Adjustment years are  defined as years in which the
percentage variation in dependent employment at the sectoral level exceeds the average sectoral variation over the period 1971-1995 by
one standard deviation. Sectoral employment data source: International Sectoral Data Base 1997, OECD. For the description of the
variables see the note to Table 3.Table 9
   SOCIAL LEARNING AND FIRMS PERFORMANCE
Explanatory variable Fixed effects estimates                         LAD estimates
12 3 4
Average size of largest three
firms in the district/average firm







th percentile of firms size in














Number of observations 20,380 20,380 20,380 20,380
Number of firms 2,688 2,688 2,688 2,688







The left hand side is firm’s gross profits as a share of firm’s total assets. Size is measured by firm sales. Only specialized firms are
considered. Each regression includes a full set of year dummies, regional dummies, sector dummies and 4 dummies for firms size
(one for each sales quartile); all regression except the LAD estimates include firm fixed effects.Table A1
  POPULATION AND SAMPLE MARGINAL FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION BY FIRM SIZE, SECTOR
OF ACTIVITY AND GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION IN 1990
 Marginal frequency distribution
Population
          (1990 census)
 Sample
Firms size (number of employees)










Trentino Alto Adige 1.1 1.1
Veneto 8.9 9.3
Friuli Venezia Giulia 2.4 3.5













Population and sample refer to firms with more than 50 employees.$SSHQGL[ WKH &RPSDQ\ $FFRXQWV 'DWD 6HUYLFH &$'6
Our data are drawn from Italy’s Company Accounts Data Service, a large database with
information on a sample of over 30,000 Italian ¿rms. The data, available since 1982 and up
to 1996, are collected by Centrale dei Bilanci, an organization established in the early 1980s
jointly by the Bank of Italy, the Italian Banking Association (ABI) and a pool of leading
banks with the intent of building up and sharing information on borrowers. In addition to
company accounts the database contains detailed information on ¿rms’ demographics (year
of foundation, location, type of organization, ownership status, structure of control, group
membership etc.), on employment, and on Àows of funds. Balance sheets are reclassi¿ed to
reduce the dependence of the data on the accounting conventions used by each ¿rm to record
income¿guresandassetvalues. Balancesheetsforthebanks’majorclients(de¿nedbyle v elof
borrowing) are collected by the banks. The focus on the level of borrowing skews the sample
towards larger ¿rms. Furthermore, because most of the leading banks are in the northern
part of the country, the sample has more ¿rms headquartered in the North than in the South.
Finally, since banks are most interested in ¿rms that are creditworthy, defaulting ¿rms are not
in the data set, so that the sample is also tilted towards high-quality borrowers. Despite these
potential biases the comparison between sample and population moments in Table 1 suggests
that the CADS is fairly representative of the whole population. This is con¿rmed by the data
in Table A1, which compares the marginal frequency distribution by size and geographical
location in the sample and in the population in 1990. While the geographical distribution of
¿rms in the sample is not too far from that in the population, it is biased towards larger ¿rms,
especially those with 1,000 or more employees.5HIHUHQFHV
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